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Abstract 
Can metacognition increase trauma sufferers’ risk for developing and maintaining 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)? We assessed the role of a range of cognitive and 
metacognitive belief domains—including meta-memory—in PTSD symptoms. Adult 
participants reported their existing meta/cognitions and lifetime exposure to trauma, then 
twelve weeks later, they reported meta/cognitions and PTSD symptoms in relation to new 
trauma exposure since the initial assessment. Participants with more PTSD symptoms held 
more problematic metacognitions than participants with fewer distress symptoms. Moreover, 
people who endorsed maladaptive metacognitions before trauma exposure were more likely 
to experience symptoms of PTSD after exposure. Metacognition predicted the maintenance of 
elevated PTSD symptoms over the twelve-week delay. Our findings support the 
metacognitive model of PTSD and highlight the importance of meta-memory, an 
understudied factor in PTSD research.   
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Metacognitive and Meta-Memory Beliefs in the Development and Maintenance of 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
 Exposure to a sudden or sustained stressful experience can lead to psychological 
problems such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Hallmark symptoms of PTSD include 
repeated and unwanted re-experiencing of the event, negative alterations in arousal, 
reactivity, cognition and mood, and active avoidance of trauma reminders (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Yet, attesting to human resilience, not all trauma-exposed 
people develop PTSD (Lee, 2006). Determining why some trauma-exposed people develop 
serious psychopathology when others do not is of critical clinical significance. Recently, 
metacognition—beliefs about thinking that guide our thinking and coping—has received 
attention for its role in PTSD (Wells, 2000). PTSD sufferers who endorse maladaptive 
metacognitive beliefs post-trauma tend to exhibit more PTSD symptoms (e.g., Roussis & 
Wells, 2006). However, research to date has not examined the role metacognition might play 
in trauma reactions over time. Here, we examined whether dysfunctional metacognition pre-
trauma predicted PTSD symptomatology post-trauma, and whether metacognitive beliefs 
predicted the maintenance of elevated PTSD symptom levels over time.  
 Wells’ (2000; Wells & Sembi, 2004) metacognitive model focuses on how people’s 
metacognitive beliefs can lead to PTSD. It stipulates that intrusions, startle responses and 
increased arousal are normal responses to trauma, forming part of a self-righting, reflexive 
adaptation process (RAP) that initiates automatically and determines adjustment and 
recovery. The RAP’s goal is to simulate plans for future threats. Thus, symptoms should 
subside once a satisfactory plan is established. However, metacognitive beliefs that 
encourage dysfunctional thinking styles or maintain focus on danger or the person’s 
unsatisfactory reactions to trauma—worry/rumination, thought suppression, threat 
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monitoring—can obstruct the RAP and thus interfere with spontaneous recovery from trauma 
(Wells & Sembi, 2004).  
Researchers have investigated a range of maladaptive cognitive and metacognitive 
beliefs trauma-exposed people hold. We know people who negatively appraise their traumatic 
experience are at increased risk of pathology (Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin, & Orsillo, 1999) and 
people who interpret their intrusive memories negatively are less able to overcome their 
posttraumatic symptoms (e.g., Ehlers, Mayou, & Bryant, 1998; Halligan, Michael, Clark, & 
Ehlers, 2003). Recent evidence suggests that training people to adopt a positive appraisal 
style regarding their ability to appropriately respond to trauma led to fewer analogue 
symptoms (Woud, Holmes, Postma, Dalgleish & Mackintosh, 2012). Moreover, Kleim et al. 
(2013) found that changes in dysfunctional trauma-related appraisals led to decreased PTSD 
symptoms among PTSD patients who received trauma-focused cognitive behavior therapy. 
Indeed, people who hold maladaptive beliefs pre-trauma may be predisposed to 
develop PTSD. Bryant and Guthrie (2005) found that trainee firefighters with a pre-existing 
tendency for negative self-appraisal—but not cognition concerning self-blame or the world as 
unsafe—were more symptomatic six months later. These results suggest that studying 
people’s cognition—and perhaps their metacognition—pre-trauma may help identify people 
most at risk for PTSD symptomatology.  
Indeed, Bennett and Wells (2010) found student nurses who endorsed negative meta-
memory beliefs (e.g., “having gaps in memory of the event means I am not normal”) were 
more likely to exhibit PTSD symptoms after a distressing event during their training. 
Moreover, such beliefs predicted PTSD better than objective indicators of memory problems 
in participants’ recall narratives. These data suggest that metacognitive beliefs about 
memorial problems may be an important area for further research.  
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In summary, extant research demonstrates that dysfunctional meta/cognition may 
render people more vulnerable to increased PTSD symptomatology. Does metacognition also 
play a role in maintaining posttraumatic stress? Some studies show that post-trauma 
cognition independently predicts PTSD when measured between several months and one-year 
post trauma (e.g., Ehlers et al., 1998; Halligan et al., 2003), and, in children, mediates the 
relationship between initial and longer-term PTSD symptoms (Meiser-Stedman, Dalgleish, 
Glucksman, Yule & Smith, 2009). However, to our knowledge, no study has investigated 
whether metacognition contributes to the maintenance of persistent PTSD symptoms in 
adults over time.  
The Present Study  
 We investigated the role of cognitive and metacognitive factors in predicting and 
maintaining PTSD among a non-clinical adult population. Even short research timeframes 
can capture a high prevalence of trauma in non-clinical populations (e.g., eight weeks; Frazier 
et al., 2009). However, to increase the likelihood that we would capture trauma, we assessed 
participants over twelve-weeks. We measured participants’ trauma-related cognition, 
metacognition and PTSD symptoms pre- and post- any recent trauma exposure. Our aims 
were threefold. First, we examined the cross-sectional relationship between a range of 
cognitive and metacognitive belief domains—including positive and negative meta-memory 
beliefs—and PTSD reactions to traumatic events. Second, we examined whether pre-existing 
metacognitive beliefs (T1) increased PTSD symptomatology after trauma (T2). Third, we 
investigated whether metacognition predicted the maintenance of elevated PTSD symptom 
levels over time. 
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Method 
Participants  
 Participants (N=664) were residents of Australia (n=74), Canada (n=17), New 
Zealand (n=4), the UK (n=51) and USA (n=518), at least 18 years old, and fluent in English. 
We recruited participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (n=372; these participants received 
$0.75 at Time 1 and $0.75 at Time 2, in keeping with rates of compensation by time for other 
psychology studies), the Flinders University Psychology Research Participation Pool (n=33, 
course credit), and standard research recruitment websites and social networking sites 
(n=259, voluntary participation). Of the 683 who completed the Time 1 (T1) survey, 315 also 
participated at Time 2 (T2). We embedded manipulation checks to ensure participants paid 
attention and excluded participants who failed more than one (n=13 at T1, n=10 at T2). From 
T1, we also excluded five participants who did not meet the eligibility criteria, and one 
participant who completed the survey twice. From T2, we were unable to use one participant 
who had failed attention checks at T1, one participant who could not be matched to their T1 
data, and three participants who completed T2 18 weeks or more after T1. The final sample 
comprised 664 T1 participants and 300 T2 participants. Table 1 shows their demographics 
and descriptive information for the main measures. Notably, at T1, participants who did not 
complete T2 were significantly older (p<.01), reported significantly more PTSD symptoms 
(p<.01), and significantly higher problematic cognition and metacognition on all but positive 
meta-memory beliefs (ps<.05), compared to completers.  
This research was approved by the Social and Behavioural Research Ethics Committee at 
Flinders University and conducted in accordance with the provisions of the World Medical 
Association Declaration of Helsinki.  
Measures 
 We administered all measures at T1 and T2, twelve weeks apart.  
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 Personal information. Participants completed demographic questions (age, ethnicity, 
country of residence, highest education level achieved) and provided their email address. 
Depression and anxiety. The 14-item Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS, 
Zigmund & Snaith 1983) assessed anxiety and depression symptoms. Participants rated each 
item from 0-3 according to how they felt during the previous week (anchors vary by item). 
The depression subscale focuses mainly on the reduced pleasure response aspect of 
depression (e.g., “I feel cheerful”; 0=Most of the time, 3=Not at all) while the anxiety 
subscale focuses on generalized anxiety and panic (e.g., “worrying thoughts go through my 
mind”; 0=Only occasionally, 3=A great deal of the time). For our sample, internal 
consistency was: Anxiety: T1=.81, T2=.88; Depression: T1=.73, T2=.87. 
 Traumatic events. The Trauma History Screen (THS; Carlson et al., 2011) assessed 
lifetime exposure to potentially traumatic events at T1; at T2, participants indicated whether 
they had experienced any of the events since T1. Participants also specified their age (or days 
since the event for T2), and how emotionally distressed they were at the time of the event 
(not at all/a little/somewhat/much/very much). Next, participants indicated their self-
nominated worst event and described that event briefly. The psychometric properties of this 
scale are comparable or better than longer measures of trauma exposure (Carlson et al., 
2011).  
 Posttraumatic stress symptoms. The PTSD Checklist-Specific Version (PCL; 
Weathers, Litz, Herman, Huska, & Keane, 1993) assessed posttraumatic stress. Participants 
responded to 17 items regarding their self-nominated worst event at T1 and T2 and their 
symptoms within the past two weeks, using a 5-point scale (1=not at all—5=extremely). The 
internal consistency in the current sample was T1=.95 and T2=.95.  To investigate symptom 
maintenance over the T1-T2 delay, we classified participants’ PTSD symptoms as ‘persistent’ 
if they displayed elevated PCL scores (>44) at T1 and T2, and as ‘recovered’ if they 
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displayed elevated scores at T1 but not at T2 (that is, we followed: Blanchard, Jones-
Alexander, Buckley, & Foreris, 1996; Bonanno, 2005; Robinaugh et al., 2011). 
Trauma related cognitions. The Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory (PTCI; Foa et al., 
1999) measured negative cognitions about the self (e.g., “I can’t rely on myself”), and the 
world (e.g., “you can never know what or who may harm you”), and self-blame (e.g., “the 
event happened because of the way I acted”). Participants rated their agreement with each 
statement (1=totally disagree—7=totally agree). Here, the PTCI demonstrated adequate 
reliability for each subscale (self: .96 & .97; world: .92 & .91; self-blame: .88 & .94).   
 Metacognitive beliefs. We selected three subscales of the Metacognitions 
Questionnaire-30 (MCQ-30; Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004) due to their established 
association with PTSD (Roussis & Wells, 2006): positive beliefs about worry (e.g. “worrying 
helps me cope”), beliefs about the uncontrollability and danger of thoughts (e.g. “my 
worrying is dangerous for me”), and beliefs about the need to control thoughts (e.g. “it is bad 
to think certain thoughts”). Participants rated their agreement with each statement on a 4-
point scale (1=do not agree—4=agree very much). The MCQ-30 is well validated in adults 
(Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004). Cronbach’s alpha ranged from .77 to .92. The 10-item 
Response to Intrusions Questionnaire (RIQ; Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999)1 measured negative 
inferences about the meaning of intrusive memories. Participants who had experienced 
intrusions rated what they thought their intrusions meant (e.g., “my life is ruined”) on a 7-
point scale (1=totally disagree —7=totally agree). The scale has previously shown good 
reliability and predictive validity (e.g., Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999; Halligan et al., 2003). Here, 
internal consistency was T1=.92 and T2=.91.   
 Meta-memory. The Beliefs about Memory Questionnaire (BAMQ; Bennett & Wells, 
2010) assessed metacognition about traumatic memory. The 15 items measured positive 
                                                            
1 Due to an initial coding error on the survey, we were unable to use T1 RIQ data for 92 participants.  
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beliefs about needing a complete trauma memory (e.g., “I must try to remember all of the 
details of the event so that I can understand why it happened”) and negative beliefs about the 
consequences of not having a complete memory (e.g., “gaps in my memory for the event are 
preventing me from getting over it”). Participants rated their agreement with each belief on a 
4-point Likert scale (1=Do not agree—4=Agree very much). Bennett and Wells (2010) found 
preliminary support for the convergent validity of the BAMQ subscales with subscales of the 
MCQ-30. Here, the internal consistency was .91 (T1) and .92 (T2) for positive beliefs and .85 
for negative beliefs at both T1 and T2.  
 Because responses on the PTCI, BAMQ and RIQ are anchored to a specific traumatic 
event, we asked participants to respond in reference to their worst nominated event or, if they 
had not described one, a negative event that they had experienced.  
Procedure 
At T1, participants completed the questionnaire battery online. Approximately 12 
weeks later, we emailed participants who consented to be recontacted with the link to the T2 
survey (completion time=77—91 days after T1). Participants received full debriefing 
information at the study conclusion.  
Results 
 All analyses were two-tailed and alpha was set at .05. Several subscale scores at T1 
and T2 were positively skewed. Although square root and log transformations reduced the 
skew, the overall pattern of results was the same; thus, we retained the original untransformed 
data for analysis. We replaced missing items on questionnaires using mean substitution (by 
subscale). 
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 Consistent with prior studies, most (n=633, 95.3%) participants reported experiencing 
at least one lifetime trauma (Breslau et al., 1998; Frazier et al., 2009).2 The most frequent 
self-nominated worst events were: unexpected death of a loved one (n=173), “other” trauma 
(n=105, e.g., childhood emotional abuse, stillbirths, kidnappings), child sexual assault 
(n=67), sudden abandonment (n=48) and transport accident (n=46). At T2, 35% (n=107) 
reported experiencing at least one "new" trauma; all but one also reported a lifetime trauma at 
T1. Of these recent events, “other” events were most commonly nominated as the worst 
(n=48, e.g., Elementary School Shootings, Boston Bombings, Hurricane Sandy). Of 
participants displaying elevated (>44) PTSD symptoms at T1 (n=214, of whom 78 also 
completed T2), 56.4% (n=44) showed persistently elevated PTSD symptoms at T2, and 
43.6% (n=34) were classified as recovered.  
 Table 1 also shows the cross-sectional relationships between the demographic, 
cognitive, metacognitive and symptom variables at T1 and T2. Females reported significantly 
more PTSD symptoms than males at T1, t(662)=-2.84, p<.01, d=.24. Age at trauma was 
significantly and negatively related to PTSD. Number of prior traumas, emotional distress at 
the time of the trauma, anxiety, depression, and all types of cognition and metacognition were 
positively and significantly associated with PTSD symptoms at both time points. Participants’ 
negative cognitions about the self were highly correlated with other variables; in particular 
with PTSD (r=.70) and RIQ (r=.83). Thus, we excluded this variable from our regression 
analyses due to multicollinearity.3  
                                                            
2 Table S1 in the Supplemental Material available online shows the lifetime prevalence of each potentially 
traumatic event, as well as participants’ exposure to these events between T1 and T2. 
3 We tested our hypotheses using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and logistic regression analyses. One 
might be concerned that the predictors in our models could be highly correlated. To address this concern, we 
verified each of our analyses using ridge regression (Hoerl & Kennard, 1970; Maydeu‐Olivares & Millsap, 2009). 
Ridge regression improves a model’s predictive accuracy in cases where there are more predictors than 
observations, and/or when the predictors are highly correlated. The ridge regression results did not differ from 
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 We next conducted a (forced entry) hierarchical regression to examine whether 
certain demographic, cognitive and metacognitive variables predicted the degree of 
concurrent PTSD symptomatology at T14. In Step 1, we entered five ‘control’ variables—age 
at trauma, distress at the time of recent worst trauma exposure, gender, number of prior 
traumas, and depression; these variables accounted for a significant proportion of the 
variance in symptoms (43%). All were independent predictors except gender and distress; 
depression, which is often comorbid with PTSD (APA, 2013), was the strongest predictor. In 
Step 2, pre-existing cognitive beliefs accounted for a significant additional proportion of 
symptom variance (10%); depression, age at trauma, and number of prior traumas remained 
significant predictors, and world beliefs and self-blame were also independent predictors. In 
Step 3, metacognitive beliefs also accounted for a significant proportion of symptom variance 
over and above the control and cognitive variables (11%). Depression, prior traumas, and 
world beliefs from Step 2 remained significant predictors, along with beliefs concerning the 
uncontrollability and danger of thoughts, positive and negative meta-memory beliefs, and 
negative inferences about intrusive memories. The overall model explained 64% total 
variance in PTSD, F(13, 348)=47.96, p<.001.   
 We next examined whether pre-existing metacognitive beliefs predicted degree of 
PTSD symptomatology following recent trauma exposure (i.e., exposure between T1 & T2), 
we conducted a (forced entry) hierarchical regression. Here, we included only participants 
who had experienced a novel trauma (n=107) between T1 and T2, with T2 PCL as the 
outcome variable. Of these, 25 participants had no score for the RIQ, because it was only 
administered to participants who reported intrusions. To maximize the available sample size, 
we used the Expectation-Maximization (EM) technique in SPSS to replace missing values 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
those obtained with OLS and logistic regression; hence, we report only the latter ones for ease of 
interpretation. 
4 Table S2 in the Supplemental Material available online displays the full regression table. 
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for participants who did not report age at the time of the trauma (n=3), distress relating to the 
trauma (n=7), or either of these variables (n=2). We entered six control variables—age and 
distress at the time of recent trauma exposure, depression, gender, number of prior traumas, 
and whether or not the person had elevated PTSD symptom levels at T1—simultaneously in 
Step 1. We added the cognitive variables (T1) in Step 2 and the metacognitive variables (T1) 
in Step 3. 
 Table 2 displays the regression statistics for each step of the model. As shown in Step 
1, the control variables accounted for a significant proportion of variance in T2 PTSD 
symptoms (55%). In Step 2, pre-existing cognitive beliefs did not explain significant 
additional variance (1%). However, as predicted, in Step 3 pre-existing metacognitive beliefs 
did account for a significant proportion of additional variance (13%). In particular, pre-
existing beliefs concerning the uncontrollability/danger of thoughts and negative inferences 
about intrusive memories significantly and independently predicted PTSD symptoms after 
recent trauma. These variables are important contributors to the final model, uniquely 
accounting for 5.29% and 2.96% of the variance respectively. Other critical variables are 
depression (5.95%) and prior traumas (3.39%). However, contrary to our hypothesis, people 
who, at T1, did not strongly believe that they needed to control their thoughts had more 
symptoms of PTSD at T2 (2.46%). The overall model explained 69% total variance in PTSD, 
F(14, 67)=10.47, p< .001. 
  We also predicted that maladaptive meta/cognitions would drive the persistence of 
PTSD and hence differentiate people who experienced elevated PTSD symptoms between T1 
and T2 and people whose symptoms abated. Using only those participants whose symptoms 
were classified as either ‘persistent’ or ‘recovered’ at T2 (n=78, less 12 participants with no 
RIQ score), we entered the cognitive and metacognitive variables into a (forced entry) 
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hierarchical multivariate logistic regression analysis.5 This model accurately predicted 83.3% 
of cases and contained only negative meta-memory beliefs (OR=1.35 [1.01, 1.81], p<.05), 
and negative inferences about the meaning of intrusions (OR=1.17 [1.03, 1.33], p=.01) as 
significant predictors of persistent PTSD symptoms (χ2=38.61, p< .01).  
Discussion 
 We examined the relationship between specific types of metacognition and the 
development and maintenance of posttraumatic stress symptoms. Considering the 
correlational data, at T1 and T2, the more our participants held unhelpful beliefs, the more 
PTSD symptomatology they showed. Interestingly, cognition about the self was the most 
important correlate of PTSD symptomatology, corroborating previous research (vs. 
world/self-blame; Bryant & Guthrie, 2005; Foa & Rauch, 2004; Moser, Hajcak, Simons, & 
Foa, 2007). This result is not surprising, given substantial conceptual overlap between 
negative self-related cognition, and symptoms, as well as with our other key variables. Of the 
metacognitive beliefs, at T1 negative meta-memory beliefs were the most important while at 
T2 it was beliefs about intrusions. However, these particular results do not speak to whether 
pre-trauma metacognition predicts later PTSD symptomatology.   
 Thus, we examined whether cognitive and metacognitive factors predicted PTSD 
symptomatology after trauma exposure. We found that pre-existing cognitive and 
metacognitive beliefs (T1) predicted PTSD symptom levels after exposure to a novel trauma 
(T2). Specifically, people reported more PTSD symptoms when exposed to trauma if they 
had showed concern that their thoughts were dangerous, and made negative inferences about 
the meaning of their intrusive symptoms. In addition, people who, pre-trauma, believed the 
                                                            
5 Due to the reduced sample size available for analysis, we included only the theoretical predictors of interest 
(i.e., cognitive and metacognitive factors) here. Table S3 in the Supplemental Material available online displays 
the full regression table. 
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world to be more safe and predictable, and did not believe that they should control their 
thoughts, were also more likely to report more symptoms post-trauma. Perhaps for people 
with overly-optimistic views of the safety and fairness of the world, trauma shatters their 
basic beliefs and leads them to shift those beliefs to the other extreme (Janoff-Bulman, 1992; 
Foa & Riggs, 1993). Our data, like Bryant and Guthrie's (2005), suggest beliefs that the world 
is dangerous and that it is bad to think certain thoughts, are activated post—rather than pre—
trauma exposure (c.f., Foa & Riggs, 1993). Finally, we found the extent to which people held 
meta-memory beliefs that fragmentary trauma memory was pathological, and made negative 
inferences about the meaning of intrusions played a significant role in maintaining elevated 
PTSD symptoms over twelve-weeks. These results support the hypothesis that metacognition 
plays an important role in PTSD maintenance among adults.  
Taken together, our results support the metacognitive model of PTSD (Wells, 2000): 
Problematic metacognitions likely blocked participants’ adaptation process, increasing their 
focus on threat such that anxiety and a sense of ongoing danger persisted, which in turn 
maintained symptoms (e.g., Roussis & Wells, 2006). Our data also contribute to a growing 
literature showing the importance of meta-memory beliefs (about intrusive memories and 
memory deficits) to PTSD symptoms. In particular, negative beliefs that a fragmented 
memory means something bad, or is abnormal, predicted PTSD maintenance.  
Whether people with PTSD have fragmentary and disorganized memories for their 
traumatic experience has long been debated (e.g., Ehlers, Ehring, & Kleim, 2012). Our data 
suggest that negative metacognition about traumatic memory might contribute to trauma-
exposed people’s struggle to resolve their symptoms. Interestingly, people’s metacognition 
becomes more apparent the more they report recurrently thinking about an event. The more 
we think about an event, the more we might think details are missing from memory. 
Recovering previously inaccessible details creates an impression of partial amnesia (e.g., 
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Bernsten & Rubin, 2014). Yet, non-clinical research suggests this is not unique to traumatic 
memory (Read & Lindsay, 2000). Thus, it is unclear whether disorganization in traumatic 
memories contributes significantly to PTSD symptoms, or if meta-memory beliefs and 
strategies concerning trauma memory (e.g., rumination, ‘gap filling’) play a greater role in 
maintaining symptoms. We do know, however, that rumination mediates the relationship 
between meta-memory beliefs and intrusive PTSD symptoms (Bennett & Wells, 2010).   
There are several limitations to our study. First, although we gathered data 
prospectively, the study lasted only twelve-weeks. In addition, because not all participants 
met the one-month duration criterion for PTSD with symptoms at T2, it is possible that, 
amongst this group, symptomatology represented normal stress reactions to trauma. 
Importantly, we did not include a clinical diagnostic interview to assess PTSD or any other 
psychopathology at T1 that could potentially account for our results. Also, we used a 
convenience sample of students and a broad section of internet users, who were 
predominantly Caucasians from the USA, which may limit the generalizability of our 
findings. Moreover, because the participants reporting the highest levels of problematic 
metacognition and PTSD symptoms at T1 were less likely to complete the entire study, our 
final T2 sample was not representative of those at the more extreme end. Also, although we 
initially recruited a large sample, due to incomplete data on some measures, the final sample 
size we used for our main regression analyses was limited. Finally, in interpreting the 
separate contribution of metacognitions to the development and maintenance of posttraumatic 
stress symptoms, it is important to acknowledge that the RIQ could potentially also be 
indexing cognitions, rather than just pure meta-cognitions. 
Considering our key findings, and the limitations of our study, we would suggest two 
future research areas. To advance our understanding of how metacognitive beliefs may lead 
to PTSD after new trauma exposure, we suggest conducting a similar longitudinal study with 
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people at high risk of trauma exposure, such as emergency service personnel (e.g., Bryant & 
Guthrie, 2007). Research could also examine whether cognitive bias training (Woud et al., 
2012) directed specifically at changing problematic metacognitive beliefs halts the 
development of symptoms after new trauma, or reduces symptoms relating to previous 
trauma. This method would help determine whether metacognitive beliefs are causal risk 
factors for PTSD (Kraemer, Kazdin, Offord, Kessler, Jensen & Kupfer, 1997). In both lines 
of research, we suspect it will be important to employ a longer delay when assessing the role 
of metacognition in maintaining PTSD symptoms over time, and to attempt to capture 
metacognition and symptoms immediately after trauma exposure. 
 In summary, our results indicate that metacognition—particularly regarding traumatic 
memory, a new area of investigation—plays an active role in adult PTSD. Specifically, this 
evidence adds to growing empirical support that metacognitive beliefs are important to 
predicting PTSD symptomatology.   
METACOGNITION, META-MEMORY AND PTSD 17 
References 
American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders. (5th ed.). Washington, DC: Author. 
Belsley, D. A., Kuh, E., & Welsch, R. E. (2005). Regression diagnostics: Identifying 
influential data and sources of collinearity. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.  
Bennett, H., & Wells, A. (2010). Metacognition, memory disorganisation and rumination in 
posttraumatic stress symptoms. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 24, 318-325. DOI: 
10.1016/j.janxdis.2010.01.004 
Berntsen, D. & Rubin, D.C. (2014). Involuntary memories and dissociative amnesia: 
Assessing key assumptions in PTSD research. Clinical Psychological Science, 2, 174-
186. DOI: 10.1177/2167702613496241. 
Blanchard, E. B., Jones-Alexander, J., Buckley, T.C., & Forneris, C. A. (1996). Psychometric 
properties of the PTSD Checklist (PCL). Behaviour Research and Therapy, 34, 669-
673. DOI: 10.1016/0005-7967(96)00033-2 
Bonanno, G. A. (2005). Resilience in the face of potential trauma. Current Directions in 
 Psychological Science, 14, 135-148. DOI: 10.1111/j.0963-7214.2005.00347.x 
Breslau, N., Kessler, R. C., Chilcoat, H. D., Schultz, L. R., Davis, G. C., & Andreski, P. 
 (1998). Trauma and posttraumatic stress disorder in the community: The 1996 Detroit 
 area survey of trauma. Archives of General Psychiatry, 55, 626–632. DOI: 
 10.1001/archpsyc.55.7.626 
Bryant, R. A., & Guthrie, R. M. (2005). Maladaptive appraisals as a risk factor for 
posttraumatic stress: A study of trainee firefighters. Journal of Psychological Science, 
16, 749-752. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2005.01608.x 
Carlson, E. B., Smith, S. R., Palmieri, P. A., Dalenberg, C., Ruzek, J. I., Kimerling, R., 
Burling, T. A., & Spain, D. A. (2011). Development and validation of a brief self-
METACOGNITION, META-MEMORY AND PTSD 18 
report measure of trauma exposure: the Trauma History Screen. Psychological 
Assessment, 23, 463-477. DOI: doi.org/10.1037/a0022294 
Clohessy, S., & Ehlers, A. (1999). PTSD symptoms, response to intrusive memories and 
coping in ambulance service workers. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 38, 
251-265. DOI: 10.1348/014466599162836 
Ehlers, A., Ehring, T., & Kleim, B. (2012). Information processing in Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder. In J. G. Beck & D. M. Sloan (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Traumatic 
Stress Disorders (pp. 191-218). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ehlers, A., Mayou, R. A., and Bryant, B. (1998). Psychological predictors of posttraumatic 
stress disorder after motor vehicle accidents. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 107, 508-519. DOI: 10.1037//0021-843X.107.3.508 
Foa, E. B., Ehlers, A., Clark, D. M., Tolin, D. F., & Orsillo, S. M. (1999). The posttraumatic 
cognitions inventory (PTCI): development and validation. Journal of Psychological 
Assessment, 11, 303-314. DOI: 10.1037/1040-3590.11.3.303 
Foa, E. B., & Rauch, S. M. (2004). Cognitive changes during prolonged exposure versus 
prolonged exposure plus cognitive restructuring in female assault survivors with 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 72, 
879–884. DOI: 10.1037/0022-006X.72.5.879 
Foa, E. B., & Riggs, D. S. (1993). Post-traumatic stress disorder in rape victims. In J. 
Oldham, M. B. Riba, & A.Tasman, Annual review of psychiatry (Vol. 12) (pp. 273-
303). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association. 
Frazier, P., Anders, S., Perera, S., Tomich, P., Tennen, H., Park, C., & Tashiro, T. (2009). 
Traumatic events among undergraduate students: prevalence and associated 
symptoms. Journal of Counselling Psychology, 56, 450-460. DOI: 10.1037/a0016412 
METACOGNITION, META-MEMORY AND PTSD 19 
Halligan, S. L., Michael, T., Clark, L. M., & Ehlers, A. (2003). Posttraumatic stress disorder 
following assault: the role of cognitive processing, trauma memory, and appraisals. 
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 71, 419-431. DOI: 10.1037/0022-
006X.71.3.419 
Hoerl, A. E., & Kennard, R. W. (1970). Ridge regression: Biased estimation for 
nonorthogonal problems. Technometrics, 12, 55–67. DOI: 
10.1080/00401706.1970.10488634 
Janoff-Bulman, R. (1992). Shattered assumptions: toward a new psychology of trauma. New 
York: The Free Press. 
Kleim, B., Grey, N., Wild, J.,; Nussbeck, F. W., Stott, R., Hackmann, A., Clark, D. M., & 
Ehlers, A. (2013). Cognitive change predicts symptom reduction with cognitive 
therapy for posttraumatic stress disorder. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology, 81, 383-393. DOI: 10.1037/a0031290 
Kraemer, H.C., Kazdin, A. E., Offord, D. R., Kessler, R.C., Jensen, P. S., & Kupfer, D. J. 
(1997). Coming to terms with the terms of risk. Archives of General Psychiatry, 54, 
337-343. DOI: 10.1001/archpsyc.1997.01830160065009 
Lee, D. (2006). Case conceptualisation in complex PTSD: Integrating theory with practice. In 
D. H. Barlow (Ed.), Clinical handbook of psychological disorders: A step by step 
treatment manual (pp.188-215). London: The Guilford Press. 
Meiser-Stedman R., Dalgleish T., Glucksman E., Yule W., & Smith P. (2009). Maladaptive 
cognitive appraisals mediate the evolution of posttraumatic stress reactions: A 6-
month follow-up of child and adolescent assault and motor vehicle accident survivors. 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 118, 778-87. DOI: 10.1037/A0016945. 
Millsap, R. E., &  Maydeu-Olivares, A. (Eds.) (2009). The SAGE Handbook of Quantitative 
Methods in Psychology. London: SAGE Publications, Ltd. 
METACOGNITION, META-MEMORY AND PTSD 20 
Moser, J. S., Hajcak, G., Simons, R. F., & Foa, E. B. (2007). PTSD symptoms in trauma-
exposed college students: The role of negative cognitions, trauma type, and anxiety. 
Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 21, 1039-1049. DOI: 10.1016/j.janxdis.2006.10.009. 
Read, J. D., & Lindsay, D. S. (2000). “Amnesia” for summer camps and high school 
 graduation: memory work increases reports of prior periods of remembering less. 
 Journal of Traumatic Stress, 13, 129-147. DOI: 10.1023/A:1007781100204 
Robinaugh, D. J., Marques, L., Traeger, L. N., Marks, E. H., Sung, S. C., Gayle, Beck, J. G., 
 Pollack, M. H., & Simon, N. M. (2011). Understanding the relationship of perceived 
 social support to post-trauma cognitions and posttraumatic stress disorder. Journal of 
 Anxiety Disorders, 25(8), 1072-1078. DOI: 10.1016/j.janxdis.2011.07.004 
Roussis, P., & Wells, A. (2006). Posttraumatic stress symptoms: Tests of relationships with 
thought control strategies and beliefs as predicted by the metacognitive model. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 40, 111-112. DOI:10.1016/j.paid.2005.06.019 
Weathers, F. W., Litz, B. T., Herman, D. S., Huska, J. A., & Keane, T. M. (1993). The PTSD 
Checklist: Reliability, validity, and diagnostic utility. Paper presented at the annual 
meeting of the International Society for Traumatic Stress Studies, San Antonio, TX. 
Wells, A. (2000). Emotional disorders and metacognition: innovative cognitive therapy. 
Chichester, UK: Wiley.  
Wells, A. & Cartwright-Hatton, S. (2004). A short form of the metacognitions questionnaire: 
properties of the MCQ-30. Behaviour Research Therapy, 42, 385-96. DOI: 
10.1016/S0005-7967(03)00147-5 
Wells, A., & Sembi, S. (2004). Metacognitive therapy for PTSD: A preliminary investigation 
of a new brief treatment. Journal of Behaviour Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 
35, 307-318. DOI: 10.1016/j.jbtep.2004.07.001 
METACOGNITION, META-MEMORY AND PTSD 21 
Woud, M. L., Holmes, E. A., Postma, P., Dalgleish, T., & Mackintosh, B. (2012). 
 Ameliorating intrusive memories of distressing experiences using computerized 
 reappraisal training. Emotion, 12, 778-784. DOI: 10.1037/a0024992 
Zigmund, A. S., & Snaith, R. P. (1983). The hospital anxiety and depression scale. Acta 
Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 67, 361-370. DOI: 10.1111/j.1600-0447.1983.tb09716.x  
 
 
 
METACOGNITION, META-MEMORY AND PTSD 22 
Authors’ Contribution 
M.T. and D.S. developed the study concept. All authors contributed to the study design. 
R.S. performed data collection; R. S. performed initial analyses and interpretation; M. T. 
performed additional analysis. R. S. and M. T. drafted the paper, and D.S. and H.F. provided 
critical revisions. All authors approved the final version of the paper for submission. 
 
METACOGNITION, META-MEMORY AND PTSD 23 
Acknowledgements 
RS was supported by an award from the NAHSSS funded by the Commonwealth 
Department of Health and Ageing.6 This planning phase of this research was supported by a 
Wellcome Trust Biomedical Vacation Scholarship supervised by MT and HF. We thank 
Caitlin Lloyd, Evan Dawson and Hannah James for their assistance in preparing study 
materials, Jacinta Oulton and Ella Moeck for their assistance with data preparation, and 
James Rockey for his advice on ridge regression.  
 
                                                            
6 The views expressed in this research do not necessarily represent those of the NAHSSS, its Administrator, 
Services for Australian Rural and Remote Allied Health (SARRAH) and/or the Government Department of 
Health and Ageing. 
Running head: METACOGNITION, META-MEMORY AND PTSD 24 
Table 1 
Demographic, Trauma-Related Characteristics, and Main Measures for the Total Sample including Cross-
Sectional Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients and Confidence Intervals with PTSD Symptoms. 
 
Note..* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. aMinority, e.g.,  African American, Hispanic, Middle Eastern, Asian American, multiracial. 
There were no significant differences in PTSD symptoms between white and non-white participants at either time point, and we 
therefore excluded ethnicity from further analysis.  bTime since trauma = years at T1, days at T2.  
 
 Time 1 (n = 664) Time 2 (n = 300) Time 1 (n = 664) Time 2 (n = 300) 
Characteristics  M (SD), R or % (n) M (SD), R or % (n) r [CI] with PCL r [CI] with PCL 
Demographics      
Age in years  32.38 (12.34), R = 18-75 35.32 (12.96), R = 18-75     
Female sex  68.5% (n = 455) 67.7% (n = 203)    
Ethnicity      
   Caucasian    83.4% (n = 554) 85.0% (n = 255)     
   Minoritya     16.6% (n = 110) 14.7% (n = 42)     
Level of Education Achieved     
   School        31% (n = 206) 28% (n = 84)     
   College/University    65.5% (n = 435) 68.7% (n = 206)    
   TAFE/trade    3.5% (n = 23) 3.3% (n = 10)     
Employment      
    Employed  63.2% (n = 420) 70.7% (n = 212)     
    Unemployed 16.7% (n = 111) 15.6% (n = 47)     
    Student 20% (n = 133) 13.7% (n = 41)     
Trauma Characteristics and Symptoms     
   Age at trauma 20.80 (11.56), R = 0-70 35.32 (12.96), R = 18-75 -.19 [-.27, -.11]
xxxx
*** -.18 [-.29, .07]** 
   Time since traumab 12.12 (11.44), R = 0-57 26.04 (22.02), R = 0-105 -.08 [-.16, -.01]   .05 [-.15, 26] 
   Number of traumas 4.06 (2.72), R = 0-13 4.36 (2.99), R = 0-15 .38 [.31, .44]***    .41 [.32, .51]*** 
   Distress at trauma  4.59 (.79), R = 1-5 3.93 (1.38), R = 1-5 .21 [.14, .28]***   . 43 [.26, .58]*** 
   HADS total 16.67 (7.06), R = 0-42 12.80 (8.29), R = 0-42 .68 [.64, .72]*** .74 [.70, .77]*** 
   HADS anxiety 10.40 (4.25), R =  0-21 7.61 (4.62), R = 0-21 .64 [.59, .70]***    .70 [.66, .74]*** 
   HADS depression 6.27 (3.63), R = 0-21 5.18 (4.52), R = 0-21 .56 [.49, .62]***    .64 [.59, .68]*** 
   PCL total 37.09 (17.38), R = 17-85 32.52 (14.97), R = 17-84 -  -  
Metacognition Measures   
   BAMQ positive  14.38 (6.27), R = 8 - 32 15.34 (6.75), R = 9-36 .44 [.38, .50]***    .56 [.48, .63]*** 
   BAMQ negative  10.01 (3.98), R = 7-28 10.72 (3.98), R = 8-32 .58 [.52, .62]***    .60 [.52, .67]*** 
   MCQ positive worry 10.84 (4.35), R = 6-24 10.60 (4.10), R = 6-24 .24 [.17, .31]***    .30 [.19, .40]*** 
   MCQ uncontrollability 13.2 (5.17), R = 6-24 12.29 (4.87), R = 6-24 .54 [.48, .59]***    .53 [.44, .61]*** 
   MCQ thought control 11.84 (4.03), R = 6-24 11.04 (4.14), R = 6-24 .43 [.37, .49]***    .39 [.29, .48]*** 
   PTCI self  2.65 (1.42) = 1-7 2.46 (1.37), R = 1-7 .71 [.67, .74]***    .76 [.71, .80]*** 
   PTCI world 4.23 (1.65), R = 1-7 3.92 (1.69), R = 1-7 .57 [.51, .61]***    .56 [.48, .63]*** 
   PTCI self-blame 2.53 (1.58), R = 1-7 2.32 (1.56), R = 1-7 .46 [.40, .52]***    .43 [.33, .52]*** 
   RIQ intrusions     14.81 (9.36), R = 6-42 13.86 (8.79), R = 6-42 .70 [.64, .74]***    .76 [.69, .81]*** 
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Table 2  
Summary of Hierarchical Regression of Control Variables, Cognitive Beliefs and 
Metacognitive Beliefs at Time 1 in Predicting Posttraumatic Stress Symptoms at Time 2 
 
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 
 
Predictor                                                         B       SE          β  Squared 
semi-partial 
correlation 
VIF 
Step 1       
    Constant -1.99 7.82     
    Age at time of trauma -.04 .10 -.03  .001 1.04 
    Number of traumas .38 .46 .06  .004 1.19 
    Distress at trauma 3.69 1.59 .19* .030 1.25 
    Gender -.82 3.13 -.02  <.001 1.29 
    Time 1 PTSD .43 .10 .45*** .111 1.82 
    Time 1 Depression 1.44 .47   .30 ** .052 1.75 
R2 = .58, F(6, 75) = 17.53, p < .001    
Step 2       
    Constant 3.52 8.70     
    Age at time of trauma -.04 .10 -.03 .001 1.05 
    Number of traumas .54 .47 .10 .007 1.25 
    Distress at trauma 3.07 1.65 .16 .019 1.35 
    Gender -.23 3.14 -.01 <.001 1.31 
    Time 1 PTSD .49 .11 .52*** .112 2.39 
    Time 1 Depression 1.68 .49 .35** .064 1.94 
    PTCI world -1.89 1.23 -.16 .013 1.97 
    PTCI self-blame -.09 .97 -.01  <.001     1.68 
R2 Change  = .01, F Change(2, 73) = 1.26, p = .289  
Step 3      
    Constant 3.51 8.91    
    Age at time of trauma  -.00 .10 -.00  <.001 1.27 
    Number of traumas 1.03 .44 .18* .025 1.34 
    Distress at trauma 2.02 1.62 .11  .007 1.56 
    Gender .40 3.15 .01  <.001 1.59 
    Time 1 PTSD .25 .12 .26* .020 3.37 
    Time 1 Depression 1.46 .49 .31** .041 2.30 
    PTCI world -2.89 1.17 -.25* .028 2.14 
    PTCI self-blame -.40 .94 -.04  .001 1.89 
    RIQ intrusions .44 .17 .28* .032 2.36 
    BAMQ positive meta-memory .20 .22 .08 .004 1.68 
    BAMQ negative meta-memory .14 .38 .04 .001 2.39 
    MCQ positive worry .15 .30 .04  .001 1.36 
    MCQ uncontrollability/danger            1.04  .36 .31** .038 2.52 
    MCQ control thoughts  -.84 .41 -.22* .020 2.48 
R2 Change  = .10, F Change(6, 67) = 3.43, p = .005  
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